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Preface 
In the fall of 1979, in my first graduate seminar on Chinese politics, I 
learned that China had launched a "one-child-per-couple" birth control 
campaign. I can still remember vividly my reaction-astonishment and awe. 
Astonishment because, as a young woman of childbearing age, I could eas-
ily imagine the implications for Chinese women of being subject to a regime 
of state regulation of childbearing. Awe because, as a student, I was as-
tounded by this latest and fearsome assertion of power by China's leaders, 
by their conviction that it was the right thing to do and that it could be 
done. I was also curious to know how the state expected to enforce such a 
policy in the face of what was sure to be massive resistance. 
This book bears the imprint of that initial reaction and of the unique op-
portunity I have had over a quarter century to examine the implementation 
of a world-historic policy, one comparable to other grand state-initiated so-
cial engineering projects of the twentieth century. For all of the attention it 
has received, both in the U.S. political arena and in the population studies 
community, China's population control efforts have yet to receive the sus-
tained scholarly attention they deserve. The rural reforms of the early and 
mid-1980s, along with the broader economic reform project, have gener-
ated innumerable and varied scholarly studies. The one-child policy, by 
contrast, though arguably just as important, has been neglected, despite its 
critical role in bridging the politics of the Maoist, Dengist, and post-Deng 
eras. As of 2005, only a handful of books have been written on the subject. 
My purpose here is to help remedy that problem by examining the political 
origins and evolution of the one-child policy and the vital role it has played 
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in China's quest for modernization. Rather than approach the issue from a 
demographic, sociological, or anthropological perspective, I focus on why 
and how the Chinese Communist regime sought to enforce birth limits, and 
with what results. 
The extension of state regulation to childbearing, and the imposition of a 
system of rationed childbirth, was seen by some observers as a harsh but 
unsurprising policy choice. This was a regime, after all, whose leaders had 
repeatedly shown themselves capable of launching radical programs of so-
cial transformation (e.g., the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolu-
tion). Once leaders reached a consensus on the threat population growth 
posed to China's modernization program, there was every reason to expect 
them to launch a campaign to check the problem. Since the late 1960s, 
moreover, many Western population experts had urged the use of all neces-
sary measures to halt the rapid growth of global population, and a few went 
so far as to advocate the use of coercive and punitive ones. Although China 
publicly condemned this pessimistic, Malthusian view, it arrived at the 
same place by a different analytical and ideological pathway. When it de-
clared rapid population growth a major threat to its modernization goals, 
therefore, and began to set strict targets for local and national growth rates, 
many observers outside China applauded the move as a reasonable reaction 
to a grave and debilitating, even crippling, problem of "overpopulation." 
Other observers condemned China's move to regulate childbirth and to 
penalize unauthorized births (unauthorized, that is, by the local authori-
ties), just as they rejected the arguments of Western pessimists who advo-
cated a similar approach. In the United States, China's birth control pro-
gram became for conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s a galvanizing 
symbol of the need for pro-life legislation, and for liberals a prime example 
of the terrible consequences of state intrusion into a domain best left to per-
sonal and private decision making. 
A divide also emerged in China during the 1980s. Because China's birth 
limitation program had begun in earnest in urban areas in the early 1970s, 
and because urban living had already begun to encourage lower levels of 
fertility, most urban couples of childbearing age either agreed with the 
state's arguments or acceded reluctantly. In the countryside, however, rural 
couples were far more skeptical. Experience had taught them that, while 
having too many children could deepen poverty and indebtedness, having 
too few could be catastrophic, resulting both in short-term and long-term 
poverty and in a decline in social status. 
As these divided views were opening up in the United States and China in 
the early 1980s, I began my research. By the early 1990s, three rounds of 
fieldwork and research in China, plus sustained library research in the 
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United States and conversations with many friends and colleagues, had illu-
minated my understanding not only of China's birth planning program but 
also of the sensitivities around the issue. As more and more people in the 
United States learned about China's policy, conversations that meandered 
along a variety of trails always seemed to have one point in common. 
Sooner or later I was asked for my view of China's policy. Having heard of 
China's population challenge, but having also heard of the draconian mea-
sures used to enforce the policy, friends and colleagues, strangers and fam-
ily members were all curious to know whether I thought the policy was jus-
tified. At times, the question came from harsh critics of China who were 
clearly hoping I would offer an unequivocal condemnation; at other times it 
was asked by those who were so worried about global population and the 
environment that they were willing to overlook the evidence of coercion in 
China's efforts to limit population growth. They, of course, hoped to hear a 
defense of the pol icy as a necessary part of China's struggle to lift its people 
out of poverty. My attempts to avoid these categoricals and offer a more 
nuanced view-one that acknowledged the gravity of China's demographic 
challenge while rejecting coercive means to tackle it-were usually heard 
politely, but most likely did little to alter previously held views. 
It has sometimes been even more difficult to discuss this issue with Chi-
nese acquaintances, friends, and strangers. Discussions about China's birth 
planning program almost always provoke the deployment of defensive 
armor in anticipation of being judged harshly by someone who doesn't un-
derstand China's situation. Perhaps my most striking encounter along these 
lines was with a stranger I encountered in the 1980s, a female graduate stu-
dent who happened to be sitting in my row on a flight from San Francisco 
to Beijing. A middle-aged Chinese man sat between us in the three-seat row, 
and when he saw me working with my research materials, he struck up a 
conversation. Before long, he was expressing his regret that Mao Zedong 
had not supported birth control in the 1950s and 1960s, and I relayed some 
of my own findings on that topic. The woman in the window seat soon 
joined in and spoke in an agitated way about the necessity for strict birth 
control in China. A wiser person would have listened carefully and respect-
fully, and asked about her own experience. Instead, I engaged her on several 
points that challenged her view. Soon, the poor man between us was trying 
to will himself into another seat as we argued across his tray table. 
Why recount this story? Because it is emblematic of the sensitivities that 
continue to surround China's population policy, sensitivities that persist 
after twenty-five years. These sensitivities make it easy to start an argument 
but hard to actually communicate. This book is my attempt to communi-
cate, to interpret the one-child policy against its historical and political 
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backdrop. It is also my attempt to show how an understanding of China's 
birth planning program is inseparable from an understanding of the politi-
cal economy of development, from the efforts of China's leaders since 1949 
to chart a course to modernization. Perhaps it is also my attempt to start 
another conversation with the woman on the airplane. 
This project has benefited greatly from the help and hospitality of many 
people and institutions. The journey began at Ohio State University, where 
Mike Lampton tutored me in the intricacies of Chinese politics and encour-
aged my interest in China's population policy. His efforts to create an ex-
change program with Wuhan University were reciprocated by the late Gao 
Shangyin (then vice president of Wuhan University), who gave me the op-
portunity to conduct research in China during a pivotal period of reform in 
the early 1980s. Professor Chen Chung-min, with whom I conducted town-
ship and village interviews in the spring of 1982, gave me an invaluable 
short course on the art and discipline of fieldwork, preparing me well for 
solo work later that year. I was graciously received and assisted by Wuhan 
University officials and staff members during three extended stays between 
1982 and 1990. Their efforts to arrange interviews and field visits made this 
work possible, as did the many officials and individuals who agreed to talk 
with me. I am particularly grateful to the township and village officials in 
Donghu (a pseudonym), whose hospitality and cooperation were essential 
to this project. The Office of Village Self-Governance of the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs arranged field visits and interviews in villages in Hebei, Shan-
dong, Liaoning, and Hubei in the early 1990s, allowing me to continue ex-
ploring the links between rural political reform and birth planning. I am 
particularly indebted to Wang Zhenyao, along with the many other central, 
provincial, and local Civil Affairs officials who assisted with these arrange-
ments and shared their insights with me. 
Financial support for this project came from Ohio State University, the 
Committee on Scholarly Communication with China, the Swarthmore Col-
lege Faculty Research Support Fund, and in 1989-90 a post-doctoral fel-
lowship at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard Univer-
sity. For their support during the fellowship year and after, I am especially 
grateful to Rod MacFarquhar, James Watson, and Merle Goldman. 
Colleagues have provided support and encouragement along the way, 
some giving generously of their time to comment on parts of this manu-
script. I am particularly indebted to Jean Oi, Marc Blecher, Dorothy 
Solinger, Thomas Bernstein, Elizabeth Perry, and Mark Selden, all of whom 
read parts or all of this work at various stages of development. Special 
thanks also to Christina Gilmartin, Gail Hershatter, and Lisa Rofel. My 
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work with them on a 1992 conference on women and gender in China, and 
on the conference volume we edited together, was a wonderful experience, 
not least because of their persistent efforts to shake up the intellectual cate-
gories and ways of seeing that came naturally to a political scientist. I am 
also indebted to Kay Johnson, who has generously shared some of her re-
search findings, and from whom I have learned much. 
Special thanks to Nancy Hearst, librarian at the Fairbank Center Library, 
for her help in finding research materials. I thank my students at Swarth-
more College who have taught me so much. Special thanks to Susan Lin, 
Matthew Williams, and Rebecca Strauss, who served as research-assistants. 
My colleagues in Political Science and Asian Studies at Swarthmore Col-
lege have been a constant source of support. I am particularly indebted to 
Lillian Li, who read and commented on a draft of this manuscript. I am also 
grateful to Roger Haydon for shepherding the project at Cornell University 
Press and to Candace Akins for her editorial assistance. 
I have also had the good fortune to be supported by a large and loving 
family, to whom I owe a great debt of thanks and gratitude. They have en-
couraged and supported and, when necessary, simply put up with me, for as 
long as I can remember. My daughter, Mingming, is my inspiration and joy. 
I learn from her every day. 
And last, a special thanks to Aunt Helen, to whom I made a promise. 
TYRENE WHITE 
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 
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